Accoutants\u27 Liability to Third Parties by Stern, Robert
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1968
Accoutants' Liability to Third Parties
Robert Stern
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Accounting Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert Stern, Accoutants' Liability to Third Parties, 17 Clev.-Marshall L. Rev. 490 (1968)
Accountants' Liability to Third Parties
Robert Stern*
T HE LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS within the accounting profession are cur-
rently in a state of uncertainty caused by both internal and external
forces. Due to fairly recent developments of the law widening the
breadth and scope of its potential liability, the accounting profession,
in an effort to more precisely define and clarify its moral and legal
duties, "is deeply involved in a great debate over how precisely account-
ing principles should be defined and how rigidly enforced." I Some spec-
tacular lawsuits recently ". . . tend to reflect the growing responsibilities
and hazards of the accounting profession in an age of increasingly com-
plex international business." 2
Duty to the Client for Misfeasance
The common law duty of care has been relatively well established
in the area of misfeasance to clients. The same standards of due care
which apply to the various other professions such as doctors, lawyers,
architects, engineers and others engaged in furnishing skilled services
for compensation are also applied to the accounting profession.3
These professional men have a duty to exercise reasonable care in
the performance of their work.4 This necessarily implies that they pos-
sess the minimum standards commonly possessed by other members of
the profession.5 More specifically, accountants have a duty to their em-
ployer to perform their work with the care and caution proper to their
calling.6 While the imposition of such standards may appear rather
harsh, further analysis reveals that liability would only arise where lack
of reasonable care, fraud, or bad faith are indicated since they are en-
titled to a wide discretion in the selection of such methods and in deter-
mining which of several practices or principles is most sound or best
suited for the work undertaken by them.7 It can be seen that where an
accountant has been negligent in his work he may well be liable for dam-
ages caused to his client.
* B.S., Ohio State University; C.P.A., Ohio; Fourth-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 Wise, The Very Private World of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, in Fortune Magazine,
July, 1966, at 129.
2 Id. at 128. See, for typical trial questions to an accountant in a negligence claim,
1 Encyc. of Negl., 15 (Form No. 9) (1962).
3 Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 252, 72 N.W. 2d 364, 367 (1955).
4 Prosser, Torts § 32 at 164 (3rd ed. 1964).
5 Id.
6 Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 173, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
7 Supra note 3.
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Duty to Third Parties for Misfeasance
More difficult problems arise where third parties, who have relied
on the work of accountants, are attempting to recover from the latter,
asserting there was a breach of their duty of care.
Judge Cardozo wrote the opinion in the landmark case in this area.,
Plaintiffs were a factor and had lent money to defendants' client, relying
on the financial statements certified by the defendants, an accounting
firm. The defendants had not verified an entry of over $700,000 to ac-
counts receivable, which subsequently was discovered as false. It was
held that defendants not only owed a duty to their client to render their
opinion without fraud, but also to creditors and investors to whom the
certificate was exhibited.9 The defendants had notice in the circum-
stances that the certificate would not be used exclusively by the em-
ployer.10
Later it was stated that an inference of fraud may be drawn where
negligence or blindness is present, at least where there is gross negli-
gence." While this appears rather harsh taken literally, the rule was
qualified earlier in the text of the decision. Realizing the ramifications
of such a broad position not only to accountants but to the other pro-
fessions, Cardozo definitely ruled out third-party liability where only
negligence could be shown.12 He felt that extending the rule so far
would "enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication
of a duty that exposes to these consequences." 13
This decision was later followed in State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst.'4
Again, a creditor was trying to recover from an accounting firm for losses
sustained by relying on an allegedly fraudulent financial statement pre-
pared by the accountants. Judge Finch, speaking for the majority of the
court, held that liability would attach where a representation was made
with no foundation.' 5
A representation certified as true to the knowledge of the account-
ants when knowledge there is none, a reckless misstatement, or an
8 Supra note 6.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Supra note 6 at 178, 174 N.E. at 449.
12 Supra note 6 at 173, 174 N.E. at 444.
13 Supra note 6 at 173, 174 N.E. at 444:
"A different question develops when we ask whether they [defendants] owed a
duty to these [third parties] to make it without negligence. If liability for negligence
exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath
the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeter-
minate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of
business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a
flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences."
14 State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E. 2d 416 (1938).
15 Id. at 112, 15 N.E. 2d at 419.
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opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that
there was no genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon which
to base liability.
Gross negligence would lead to an inference of fraud where there was
a heedlessness and a reckless disregard of consequence. 10
The scope of accountants' liability was again limited. Unless a con-
tractual relationship or its equivalent can be shown, accountants will not
be held liable for ordinary negligence.17
It is clear then, that where the accountant performs his duties fraud-
ulently or where he is grossly negligent and knows or reasonably expects
third parties to rely on his opinion, he may well be liable for any dam-
ages caused by his conduct.
Duty to Third Parties for Nonfeasance
One of the most intriguing questions currently under discussion in
this area is concerned with the liability of accountants where they have
rendered an opinion on the financial statements of their clients and, as-
suming that due care in the original opinion is not being disputed, what
are their duties when they later learn that their financial statements are
materially in error? Some of the difficult questions raised are:
How long, for instance, does the duty to disclose after-acquired
information last? To whom and how long should disclosure be
made? Does liability exist if the after-acquired knowledge is ob-
tained from a source other than the original supplier of information?
Is there a duty to disclose if an associate or employee of the account-
ing firm discovers that the financial statements are false but fails to
report it to the firm members?'
While wrongful acts are usually construed in terms of misfeasance,
an omission or failure to act can be as equally damaging. This propo-
sition has had a labored development in the common law and was slow
to receive recognition.' 9 There was a tendency in the common law to
only give relief for active misfeasance. Liability for omissions to act
belonged to a later period.20
Liability for nonfeasance first was imposed on those engaged in
"public" callings on the theory that they undertook a duty by holding
themselves out to the public.21 Later this was extended to all contractual
relationships.22
16 Id.
17 Supra note 14 at 111, 15 N.E. 2d at 418.
18 Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 189 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).
19 Prosser, supra note 4 at 334.
20 McNiece and Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 Yale L. J. 1272, 1289 (1949).
21 Prosser, supra note 4 at 334.
22 Id.
Sept. 1968
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Obviously, before liability could lie for not disclosing after-acquired
information, there must first be a duty by the person making the original
representation to disclose to those relying on it. 23 Where an accountant
renders a written opinion on the financial statements of his client, he
knows that various third parties will likely be in a position of reliance
on his word.2 4 In fact, the purpose of many audits is for the use of
government agencies, investors, creditors, unions, and other interested
parties.
25
In one of its publications, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants stated that:
Most audit reports are prepared for "general" purposes; that is, they
are intended to be useful to management, and stockholders and
others, as well as to creditors.
26
Rarely will an accountant be allowed to assert that he didn't know that
his client intended to exhibit his opinion to third parties.
Under the circumstances in question, accountants are in a position
of trust of confidence, one that assumes the position of a fiduciary. A
fiduciary relationship is not subject to absolute definition. It implies a
position of trust and confidence contemplating fair dealing and good faith
between parties. 27 Such a relationship is based on the personal confi-
dence reposed by one person in another 28 and includes informal relations
when one person trusts and relies on another, as well as technical fidu-
ciary relations.29 Some of the more obvious examples of what are gen-
erally held to be fiduciary relationships are principal and agent, attorney
and client, parent and child, and guardian and ward.80
The duty of care of one occupying the position of a fiduciary is high-
er than one acting at arms length. "A trustee is held to something stricter
than the morals of the market place." 31 "Only thus has the level of con-
23 Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. 368 (C.A. 2d 1893).
24 Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S. 2d 20, 25 (1954).
25 Touche, Niven, Baily & Smart, S.E.C. Accounting Ser. Rel. No. 78, 3 CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. fJ 72,100, 62,236 (1957). "The responsibility of a public accountant is not
only to the client who pays his fee, but also investors, creditors, and others who may
rely on the financial statements which he certifies."
26 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Questions & Answers About
Audit Reports 15 (1955-1956) (published by American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, New York, N. Y.).
27 Kinzbach Tool Co., Inc. v. Corbett-Wallace Corp., 13 Tex. 565, 566, 160 S.W. 2d 509,
512 (1942).
28 Moffatt v. Fulton, 132 N.Y. 507, 509, 30 N.E. 992, 994 (1892).
29 Glover v. National Bank of Commerce, 156 App. Div. 247, 253, 141 N.Y.S. 409, 415
(1913).
30 Curtis v. Armagast, 158 Iowa 507, 512, 138 N.W. 873, 878 (1912); O'Brien v. Stone-
man, 227 Iowa 389, 390, 288 N.W. 447, 448 (1939).
31 Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
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duct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the
crowd." 32
With the confidential relationship and the correlative duty estab-
lished, what should the law expect of the accountant after he discovers
an error? Earlier it was pointed out that at first the courts would only
give relief for misfeasance, but later imposed liability for nonfeasance
on those engaged in "public" callings and further extended this to all
contractual relations.33 Prosser states that:
During the last century, liability for "nonfeasance" has been ex-
tended still further to a limited group of relations, in which custom,
public sentiment and views of social policy have led the courts to
find a duty of affirmative action. It is not likely that this process of
extension has ended.34
The general law on this question is summarized in the Restatement
of Torts which states that where there is a duty to exercise reasonable
care, one has a duty to disclose matters which he knows may justifiably
induce a party to act or refrain from acting.35
Extending this basic principle, which has been so held in a number
of decisions, a party has the same duty to disclose
Any subsequently acquired information which he recognizes as
making untrue or misleading a previous representation which when
made was true or believed to be so.
36
In the case of Loewer v. Harris,37 negotiations were made for the sale of
a brewery. One of the primary factors in the negotiations was the profits
of the company. Plaintiffs had been given various information by the
defendants showing the profits and were told that since the information
was prepared "the business was showing a gradual increase." Later the
defendants discovered that the profits were not increasing but had actu-
ally decreased. Addressing themselves to the question, the court stated
that when a party has held out the existence of a state of facts which
are material and, knowing the other party is acting upon them, when he
later learns of a change which the other party is not aware of:
[G]ood faith and common honesty require him to correct the mis-
apprehension which he has created. It becomes his duty to make
disclosure of the changed state of facts, because he has put the other
party off his guard.38
32 Id.
33 Prosser, supra note 4 at 334.
34 Id. at 335.
35 Restatement of Torts, § 551 (1) (1938).
36 Id. § 551 (2) (b).
37 Supra note 23 at 373.
38 Id.
Sept. 1968
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The Restatement of the Law, Restitution, also takes the same po-
sition:
[O]ne who makes a statement which was true at the time of speak-
ing discovers that it is untrue with reference to present facts or if
he discovers that a statement which was immaterial when made has
become material, he is under a duty of disclosure.
39
Another case in point is Hush et ux. v. Reaugh.40 Here it was said
that:
[I]f one has made a statement which was true when made and a
material change takes place in financial condition, in value, or in
health, he is guilty of fraud in not disclosing such change when he




Accountants, like those in the other professions, have a duty to their
clients to perform their work with due care. That is, they must possess
the minimum standards of their calling and must exercise reasonable
care in their endeavors. Negligent conduct may subject them to liability.
Certain duties are often owed to third parties. They exist where it
is reasonably expected that various interested groups, other than clients,
will be relying on their work. This situation can be expected to increase
as accounting information is understood and is being used by a wider
audience as the business world grows increasingly complex and sophisti-
cated. In this situation accountants assume the role of a fiduciary and
must act accordingly.
Where a duty to third parties exists, mere negligence will usually
not create liability for misfeasance. However, where it can be shown
that they were grossly negligent or even fraudulent in their work, third
parties should be able to recover for damages caused by such conduct.
The development of common law liability for nonfeasance has had
a retarded development and more difficult problems are unfortunately
encountered. However, the courts have been more willing to grant relief
in this area in recent times. When a duty exists and damages have been
incurred, the courts will be less likely to find a difference in an original
misstatement and a failure to correct a prior statement that had been
originally made "bona fide."
39 Restatement of Restitution, § 8b. (1937).
40 Hush v. Reaugh, 23 F. Supp. 646 (Ill. 1938).
41 Id. at 652.
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